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Abstract for  
 
Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About 
Rules 
By Denis Robinson, University of Auckland 
Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral 
disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — 
and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that 
parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with 
exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist 
element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable 
nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a 
purely cognitivist account of moral judgments. Such a conclusion could be 
staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of 
cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of 
radical moral disagreement, in the parties' acceptance of a common set of 
fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a 
destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the 
important role sometimes assigned, in meta-ethical theorizing, to moral rules. 
Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between 
relativist and particularist agendas. 
 
Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and 
Skepticism About Rules 
This paper consists of two main parts. Part I discusses the use of arguments 
from radical moral disagreement — in particular as directed against absolutist 
cognitivism1 — and surveys a number of issues made salient by such 
arguments. Part 2 discuss the role of moral rules in underwriting moral 
judgment, and in particular, in determining the meanings of terms of moral 
evaluation, attacking a doctrine I call “RFMM” – “Rules Fix Moral Meanings”. 
I hope each part has some independent interest, but the important link 
between them is that RFMM is sometimes suggested as a rejoinder to the kind 
of critique of absolutist cognitivism discussed in Part I.  
Arguments from radical moral disagreement can be seen to challenge the 
objectivity of moral claims, or the epistemic accessibility of moral truths. But 
                                                
1 I comment briefly on my use of some key meta-ethical terms in a Terminological 
Appendix at the end of this article. 
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they are at their most powerful when given, broadly speaking, a semantic 
twist. So taken, they challenge what we might call the presumption of stable 
cognitivist univocity: the presumption that there is a single cognitive content 
P such that one party to the disagreement unequivocally asserts P, and the 
other unequivocally denies P. Such a presumption relies on the view that 
terms of moral evaluation used by disputing parties speaking a common 
natural language use terms of moral evaluation reliably to express the same 
cognitive content. Since this is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical 
moral disagreements, given simple cognitivist assumptions such 
disagreements demand some kind of relativist, rather than an absolutist, 
interpretation of those terms.2  
It is commonly suggested that such threats to absolutist cognitivism can be 
rebutted by appeal to alleged pervasive agreement about Fundamental Moral 
Principles. This would only work if agreement about moral principles could 
somehow provide a guarantee, contrary to appearances, that the relevant 
terms are being used by the disputing parties with an exactly equivalent, 
absolutist sense. This is the doctrine I refer to above as “RFMM”.3 
The longest portion of Part 2 comprises an argument which surveys a range of 
ways in which moral rules might figure in determining agents’ particular 
moral judgments. As these possibilities become more and more lifelike, I 
suggest, it becomes increasingly evident that some key components of moral 
judgment and understanding cannot plausibly be represented in terms of 
allegiance or conformity merely to a set of moral rules. I conclude by 
considering some possible implications of my discussion, and some 
illustrative analogies which may help to convey the attitude to moral 
principles which I advocate. This attitude has obvious affinities here with 
                                                
2 For the purposes of this paper I consider only disputes between speakers of what is 
prima facie a common natural language, mostly avoiding issues about translation of 
moral vocabulary between distinct natural languages. This somewhat artificial 
restriction, if anything, favours my opponents. Naturally, I think similar points can 
be made about moral judgments expressed in a range of languages, and issues about 
translating them. Tersman(2006) makes claims about constraints on translation 
central to his argument; see especially Chapter 6. 
3 My interest in RFMM was sparked by some remarks, reminiscent of it, appearing 
(in the context of a more complex and sophisticated position) in the work of Frank 
Jackson. See Jackson(1998); also Robinson(2009). 
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particularism. Without discussing the point at length, I certainly intend my 
discussion to suggest that particularism and relativism might have more in 
common than is often acknowledged. 
I need to say clearly here that I do not principally talk about moral choice, but 
about moral evaluation, even though I talk as if a principal target of moral 
evaluation is actions — past or future, our own or others’. My supposition in 
effect is that the sine qua non of moral choice is the general ability to morally 
evaluate actions. We may favour various mental procedures in choosing an 
action which will stand up to our own retrospective moral evaluation. But for 
all that I say, these may be merely techniques for hitting a certain target, 
where merit attaches to hitting that target, not to the techniques. This may be 
anathema to anyone wishing to base moral evaluation of actions primarily on 
the processes by which actions are chosen or generated. My discussion may 
not absolutely exclude such a view, but certainly does not presuppose it. 
Part 1: Radical Moral Disagreement, and Moral Rules: Setting Context, 
Surveying Landscape 
1.1 On stabilizing meanings 
It is reasonable to ask questions like the following about terms such as “right” 
and “wrong”, used in English to express moral evaluations. Are there 
usefully expressible criteria which constitutively govern correct application of 
those predicates to particular cases, or which are constitutive of the concepts 
those predicates express? How are those predicates given their meaning, or 
those concepts given their content, and how are those meanings, or concepts, 
taught, transmitted, stabilized, and kept constant, so as to enable successful 
communication and mutual comprehension within a community which uses 
such terms, or employs such concepts — crucially, in applying them to 
particular events and actions?  
We might ask, quite generally, what if anything anchors, fixes or sustains 
constancy of meanings across populations and times. When millions of people, 
over centuries, speak a common language, what ensures that words of that 
language are used with a common meaning, across that diverse and scattered 
population, and from one generation to the next? Notwithstanding the legacy 
of lexicography, the most general answer is surely “nothing in particular, 
beyond the mere practice of using and transmitting the language”. Languages 
surely spread and develop, to a large extent, through unconscious and, 
broadly speaking, evolutionary processes. RFMM, if correct, would constitute 
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an exception to this quietist generalization, since it singles out a quite small 
and fixed subset of contexts of moral terms as having a unique and 
controlling status in fixing the meanings of those terms. Would this be a sui 
generis exception to our generalization, or are there other exceptions which 
might to some extent provide models for this one? 
One class of such exceptions might involve procedures consciously dedicated 
to ensuring stability and commonality of meanings of particular words or 
word-families, where meaning-variation would be particularly inconvenient. 
Cases might include the sciences (think of standard physical units, and of 
biological, chemical, and medical taxonomies), the law, and organized 
competitive games (as in “the Laws of Rugby”). These cases provide only a 
limited model for understanding RFMM. One reason for this is the fact that 
there is no good moral analogue (in current secular society) for the 
recognizable and empirically testable expertise of the scientific community, 
nor for the canonical rule-fixing status of the International Rugby Board. But 
though limited, the model has some relevance, since RFMM does assign a 
special place — and potentially, a recognized one — to fundamental moral 
principles as stabilizing moral meanings. 
When thinking about how words are anchored and stabilized in their 
meanings, we must also acknowledge that for many words in our ordinary 
descriptive vocabulary this is done by straightforwardly referring to natural 
kinds, so that nature’s own joints in effect constantly calibrate our usage. Just 
as water flows naturally into gullies, verbal distinctions, it might be said, 
gravitate naturally towards distinctions in nature. Indeed the development 
and systematization of canonical meaning-fixing stipulations and procedures 
in the sciences involve building on precisely that basis, as science reflexively 
improves our understanding of it. 
1.2 Radical moral disagreements and the issue of semantic “anchoring” 
for moral terms 
Can we exploit a version of this natural-kind-oriented, self-calibrating model 
in our portrayal of RFMM? I think not. Note first that this model certainly 
does not apply to all ordinary language terms and distinctions. (Consider for 
instance distinctions drawn in rules governing behavior around the scrum in 
rugby.) There is little plausibility in the view that moral terms and concepts 
are anchored to instances of natural kinds which, through their stable patterns 
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of effects, may be identified as the kinds playing such and such causal roles.4 
One of several reasons to doubt such a view is the existence of an important 
subset of moral disagreements, those where dispute over uncontroversially 
descriptive facts is not in play.  
A premise of what follows is that such fundamental moral disputes may be 
important, deeply intractable, and in principle irresolvable, in the following 
quasi-technical sense: neither side can cite grounds for declaring the other side 
wrong, which could not reasonably be called question-begging in the context. These 
are what  — in line, pretty much, with contemporary usage, I am calling 
“radical moral disagreements”.5 These are not, it seems to me, situations 
where one might appropriately attempt to refute either party by seeking to 
backtrack along reference-transmitting causal chains, searching for a less than 
obvious “real essence”, to determine the true content of the relevant terms of 
moral evaluation.6 Moreover, an attempt to account in this kind of way for 
such stability of meaning as moral terms have, would make a poor fit with the 
narrow restriction of canonical occurrences of such terms to a relatively small 
number of Fundamental Moral Principles. 
To further clarify the notion of radical moral disagreement, let’s consider a 
sort of case which, though it blocks attempts at resolution, is not a case of this 
kind. Consider a dispute over the right way to dispose of a person’s estate, 
involving different opinions of the probable contents of a lost will. Here the 
disagreement is not a product of ignorance about any hidden or inaccessible 
moral facts (and a fortiori it is not a case of ignorance about some moral “real 
essence” of which observable features of the situation might or might not be 
causal products). Unlike cases of radical moral disagreement, the case puts no 
pressure on any view about the nature of moral facts or of the semantics of 
moral terms. The contents of the lost document have a bearing on what it is 
right to do, nevertheless insofar as it turns on those contents, the dispute is 
                                                
4 See Robinson(2004) and (2009) for discussion of some pertinent issues about words, 
concepts, and semantics. 
5 Tersman(2006) provides a penetrating exploration of such disagreements and their 
significance. 
6 These issues surface again below, in part 1.3. A more nuanced discussion 
than I can supply here, would need to consider some well-known and 
important debates pitting “Cornell Realists” against Gilbert Harman. My views are 
closer to Harman’s. 
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not properly speaking a moral one at all. Moral education is no more directed 
at learning how to find — or guess the probable contents of — lost documents, 
than it is directed at learning which observable syndromes probabilify an 
aetiology involving hidden real essences. Radical moral disagreements start 
when agreement has been reached about all such potentially relevant non-
moral facts, but moral disagreement remains. (The disputants might abandon 
appeal to claims about the probable contents of the will and begin debating 
what it is right to do on the agreed assumption that those contents will never 
be known, but that would make the case a different one.) 
Radical moral disagreements are doubly puzzling, on cognitivist and 
absolutist assumptions. On the one hand (we could call this “the primary 
puzzle”) they present what, at least in another context, might seem like 
paradigmatic evidence of terms being used with different senses – albeit, in a 
relativist or indexical way, with contextually sensitive but importantly similar 
senses.7 Thus these disagreements push cognitivists in the direction of 
relativism. On the other hand, these disagreements do not present the 
appearance we would expect if we viewed them in the light of a simple 
relativism (we could call this “the secondary puzzle”). For such a view would 
leave unexplained the appearance of a genuine disagreement: it would 
predict that the proponents would be “talking past each other”, and not 
genuinely in disagreement, robbing the entire dispute of any point once the 
misunderstanding — mistaking relative terms for absolutes — is recognized. 
As I see it, this problem is to be rectified only by moving to a hybrid view 
which combines a kind of constrained cognitivist relativism with non-
cognitivist elements.8 (This two-step is what I earlier called “the semantic 
twist” on arguments from moral disagreement.) 
                                                
7 Here we basically need a distinction reminiscent of Kaplan’s, between different 
tokens of indexical expressions which in one sense have a common type-meaning — 
the same “character” — yet in another sense have different, contextually-determined 
token-meanings — different “contents”. 
8 The implications of radical disagreements are explored in Robinson(2004) and 
(2009). I suggest in Robinson(2004) that there are radical disagreements about 
personal identity which are, as it were, radical moral disagreements by proxy. There 
I call the kind of hybrid view I believe is needed, “quasi-relativism”, and radical 
disagreements “quasi-disagreements”. I believe my standpoint here is at least 
broadly consonant with Tersman’s(2006). 
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I do not have an account to offer of the details of such a view. This much 
seems clear: it will not be a view of the “besires” kind which entails a kind of 
lock-step between belief, and some desire-like or desire-related, motivating 
attitude like “valuing”. If there is anything remotely right in the philosophers’ 
idea of the so-called “psychopath” or “amoralist” who can mirror the beliefs 
and moral claims of the person who genuinely judges something to be wrong, 
whilst having absolutely none of the accompanying motivation required by 
the so-called “internalism” constraint, it can’t be that there is an attitude 
which of necessity involves a correct proportionality between degree of belief 
and degree of motivation. Indeed if (much less controversially) it is merely 
the case that two morally concerned agents can be equally convinced of 
something’s being a clear-cut case of wrongdoing, but differ in the extent or 
force of the motivation which that judgment involves or generates in them — 
a situation entirely common in our world of morally concerned people who 
are less than saints — then we must surely think of ordinary moral judgments 
and their normal motivational accompaniments as packages of two logically 
orthogonal components, the force or degree of which can vary independently. 
If we can sensibly talk of these two “components” of moral judgments, then it 
is at least possible to ask which of them is better thought of as essential for 
type-individuating particular moral judgments. The “latitude idea” 
expounded in Tersman(2006) implies, rightly I think, that reflection on radical 
moral disagreements shows that at least for some purposes it is the 
motivational element which is more fundamental. Cases of radical moral 
disagreement, on this view, are not mere cases of talking past one another, 
despite the expressed beliefs not being logical contraries, since there is 
genuine contrariety between the practical implications of the opposing claims 
due to the associated motivational differences they express. (None of this 
entails that the latitude allowed on the belief dimension of moral judgments is 
unconstrained: that is why a pure non-cognitivist view cannot serve here.)  
Full development of a view of this genre would require carrying out the 
difficult task of saying how the content (not just the force) of the particular 
motivation-related part of the moral-judgment package relates to the 
proposition, event, state of affairs, or what have you, of which the appropriate 
property of rightness, wrongness, or goodness is predicated in the cognitive 
component of the package. Prima facie, the latter must change as we move 
from taking a prospective view, regarding a possible future action, where we 
can coherently want to perform it (or want someone else to), to a retrospective 
view of an already performed action. In the latter case we cannot coherently 
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desire that anyone either perform or un-perform that particular action. In this 
change from prospective to retrospective evaluation, the object of our attitude 
changes from an abstract action-type to a concrete action-token. This is one of 
many difficulties in constructing a detailed hybrid account. 9 
Having briefly touched on the need for, and some challenges posed by, the 
aim of articulating a hybrid view, let’s next examine some issues which bear 
on, or pave the way for, a critique of the suggested rebuttals, mentioned in 
my opening paragraph, to the style of argument which leads to it. These 
responses suggest to me a view according to which indeed there are statable 
rules determining the correct application of predicates of moral evaluation, 
and expressing a set of canonical moral principles, so that it is by teaching of 
and reference to this set of moral principles that the meaning of moral 
predicates is shared, communicated, and kept stable. The most extreme form 
of such a view — the view I dub “RFMM” — would hold that the truths 
belonging to this canonical set of principles somehow collectively distil and 
encode the foundations of all moral truth, and in so doing, fix, anchor and 
preserve the meaning of key moral terms. 
1.3 Core/periphery approaches to meaning-fixing 
That makes RFMM an instance of what I call the “core/periphery” strategy 
for attempting to rebut arguments from Radical Moral Disagreement, which 
have a semantic slant aimed at absolutist, cognitivist moral realism. This is the 
strategy — a thoroughly questionable one, in my opinion — of drawing (often 
tacitly) a “core/periphery” distinction within moral truths. It is as if 
Absolutist Cognitivists divide moral claims into two categories (aristocrats 
and commoners, as it were). Then two steps are taken. The first of them denies 
that disputants “really” disagree about morality provided they don’t disagree 
about “core” (or “aristocratic”) moral claims, even if they irrevocably disagree 
about “peripheral” (or “commoner”) claims. The second step asserts that 
                                                
9 It must be remembered that although “cognitivism” is associated with a view of 
moral judgments as primarily akin to beliefs, motivational states may be intentional 
states — propositional (or de se) attitudes —  also, and thus also have “cognitive 
content”. Where a moral judgment is a hybrid combination of a desire-like and a 
belief-like state it is perfectly reasonable to ask what the relationship is between these 
two kinds of content, and how it is constrained.  
Important and diverse suggestions for hybrid theories have been put forward by 
various authors; see for instance Campbell(2007), Copp(2001), and Ridge(2006). 
Further discussion of those views is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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radical moral disagreements only ever involve “peripheral” moral claims. 
(Perhaps they show, as it were, their lack of breeding, by getting involved in 
such disorderly disputes.) When it comes to defining, or evidencing grasp of 
the meaning of moral terms, the commoners are simply discounted. 
(Naturally these claims are not usually made in quite these terms.)  
Neither step of this procedure seems credible to me, when it is used in an 
attempt to rebut arguments from radical moral disagreements. Both steps 
seem egregiously ad hoc and incongruent with the nature of such 
disagreements. The case is very different from one where predicates are 
vague. If Ned takes offence at Don walking on his hill, Don might assert that 
the slightly sloping region around the foot of the hill, where the slope of the 
ground is 15° or less, does not count as “on” the hill, and Ned may disagree. 
Merely relying on a mutual grasp of the ordinary word “hill” will not settle 
the issue. Here it is clear that a resolution must be, if not entirely arbitrary, at 
least based on some suitably agreed or imposed convention not plausibly 
deriving solely from the standard meaning of that word. Each party to a 
radical moral disagreement, on the other hand, is likely to insist that their 
assertions are based, precisely, on a correct understanding of basic moral 
terms like “right” and “wrong”, and there is no comparable sense in which 
adopting a precisifying convention could be taken as “resolving” what is at 
issue between them. As Solomon taught us, moral disagreements do not 
always allow us to “split the difference”. 
The basic issue here is whether the disputants in radical moral disagreements 
can reasonably be held by absolutist cognitivists not to be using key moral 
terms with different senses, or at least relativized to different parameters.10 
The essential feature of a radical moral dispute is that nothing crucial is hidden 
from the disputants. Both know the large man was on the bridge, and was 
pushed to his death in front of the runaway trolley by a small but strong 
bystander, in order to save — only just — the lives of the seventeen deaf 
children standing on the track and admiring the view in the opposite 
direction. Let us set aside the possibility that the disputants disagree because 
they make different estimates of the probability that the large man would 
have gone on to find a cure for cancer, or that one of the children will do so. 
We know enough to know that disagreement in a case like this might persist 
even if they agree on all such matters. If an absolutist cognitivist view is 
                                                
10 In the Appendix I point out the broad range of views I am counting as “relativist”. 
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correct, and if properties predicated by predicates of moral evaluation do 
indeed supervene on uncontroversially descriptive properties, then in such 
cases the disputants, in agreement about the uncontroversially descriptive, 
display different understandings of the relevant supervenience relations.11 
But unless moral predicates have a causal-referential semantics involving 
possibly unknown real essences, are Twin Earthable, and so on, in the way 
Putnam has taught us to see natural kind terms, the relevant supervenience 
relations are necessarily and analytically correlated with the meanings of the 
relevant terms. To understand moral terms we need to know more than, 
merely, that the moral supervenes on the descriptive: we need a suitable 
grasp of the form of the supervenience relation — and once causal-referential 
semantics is set aside, that grasp is not only necessary but sufficient to know 
the meanings. If we have differing understandings of the relevant 
supervenience relations we simply differ in our understandings of those 
terms — we attach different meanings to them. Modeling this situation in a 
way which is both consistent with absolutist cognitivism and which treats the 
disagreement as betraying a local and minor mistake, by one or both parties, 
in the use or import of moral terminology, rather than revealing a basic 
meaning-difference, seems far-fetched and, as I have said, ad hoc. 
Here’s one way to cling to absolutism while accepting the diagnosis that the 
disputants are not giving the same meaning or content to their moral 
terminology. Absolutists might hold that at least one party’s claims are not 
moral claims at all, but “schmoral” claims — claims put forward as moral, or 
playing a similar role to moral claims, but which employ what purport to be 
                                                
11 What of “thick” terms of moral evaluation, like “courageous” and “heartless”? I 
shall rely on the assumptions a) that such terms are not themselves 
“uncontroversially purely descriptive”, meaning that claims employing them, made 
by either party in a moral disagreement, “could reasonably be called question-
begging in the context”; and b) that insofar as such a term has non-evaluative 
descriptive content, that part of its content is equivalent to that of a possible 
predicate whose application supervenes on the applicability of uncontroversially 
purely descriptive terms. If those assumptions are right, I believe, it does not affect 
my discussion whether parties to a radical moral disagreement are or are not using 
such “thick” evaluative terms in expressing their disagreement. Compare 
Jackson(1998), pp.135-6, on “centralism” vs. “non-centralism”. 
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moral terms with what are actually distorted meanings.12 At least one disputant 
is not expressing genuine moral judgments, but merely schmoral judgments. 
But this claim, if it is not backed by viable analyses of the ontology, semantics, 
and epistemology of moral judgment which are capable in principle of 
distinguishing, in any given radical moral disagreement, the moral from the schmoral, 
strikes me as unattractively reminiscent of a “pie in the sky” or act of faith 
rebuttal to the challenge such disagreements pose. Someone who accepts this 
view, and is themselves party to a radical moral disagreement, must either lay 
claim hubristically to an epistemically mysterious ability to distinguish the 
moral from the schmoral, not shared by their opponent, or agree that they 
themselves are completely in the dark as to the morality of a disputed action — 
despite all the effort they have put into making a judgment based on a 
knowledge of all seemingly relevant non-moral facts, and long and earnest 
reflection and debate, and even despite having been convinced by these 
exercises of the correctness of their judgment.  
The “pie in the sky” in the case of the large man and the runaway trolley 
might be thought of as a Platonic lexicon, spelling out canonically the true 
meanings of moral terms, sufficiently clearly to demonstrate whose judgment, 
if anyone’s, is correct in this case. But it is no more plausible, based on how 
people enmeshed in stubborn moral disagreements behave, that the 
disputants are trying to judge, or dimly perceive through some spiritual 
exercise, how to apply to the case in hand semantic information to be found in 
the contents of a Platonic lexicon, than that they are debating the evidence for 
one or another hidden real essence to which their utterances of moral terms 
are causally linked. And if we don’t believe in some such symmetry-breaker 
we will remain confronted by what appears, from a cognitivist standpoint, to 
                                                
12 Milo(1986) provides an interesting example. Milo uses both a “moral/schmoral” 
distinction, and a distinct “core/periphery” distinction, in a slightly unusual way. He 
classifies what I would call radical moral disagreements into several categories: 
“moral deadlock”, “partial radical moral disagreement”, and “total radical moral 
disagreement”. These groups differ according to whether the disputants accept all, 
some, or none of the same basic moral criteria for rightness or wrongness. Milo 
argues by use of a core/periphery strategy that moral deadlocks are benign because 
they are “in-house”, since they occur between people with the same basic moral 
values. That’s his “core/periphery” strategy. He argues that the term “radical moral 
disagreements” is an oxymoron: candidates are merely mock-disagreements between 
moral and schmoral claims. That’s his moral/schmoral strategy. 
 12 
be evidence in favour of a relativist account of the meanings being expressed 
by moral terms, or of the contents of moral judgments, in such cases — 
pushing us, by way of the “secondary puzzle” about radical disagreement, 
towards the further consequences, including a sizeable concession to non-
cognitivism, noted above. 
RFMM, as a version of a core/periphery strategy, thus faces serious 
difficulties from the outset. Nevertheless I believe it is illuminating to explore 
possible details of such a position, and thus see how certain of its weaknesses 
emerge. The view may appear to have some prima facie strengths. It makes a 
concrete claim about the transmission of moral knowledge, including 
knowledge of the meanings of terms of moral evaluation; it represents 
morality — or at least, the language of moral evaluation — as a human 
institution maintained and transmitted throughout a community by way of a 
distinct vocabulary whose use is benchmarked to a finite set of claims. It 
offers to simplify the task of moral translation: identify the basic moral 
principles, and concentrate on finding apt translations of those into principles, 
hopefully already current, expressed in other languages.  
Note that the “principles” envisaged here are quite different from the “master 
principles” in terms of which one might formulate some of the great “isms” of 
moral theory: Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Intuitionism, Rationalism, etc. Such 
accounts tend to throw up just one or two basic principles, and though they 
are often defended in a priori terms, they are not really candidates for 
uncontroversial commonplaces of folk ethics, whereas that is precisely how 
an RFMM kind of view would wish to see the principles — whether they 
number ten or a dozen, several dozen, or a few hundred — which such a view 
sees as canonical. 
1.4 More holistic versions of core/periphery strategies? 
RFMM contrasts with more holistic approaches to the fixing of moral 
meanings, where so far as consistently possible, the whole totality of moral 
claims (including claims of “folk” meta-ethics) — or a very large majority of 
them — are treated as implicitly term-defining for the distinctively moral 
terminology. Jackson’s “moral functionalism” and the “analytic 
descriptivism” he bases on it, together provide an instance of such a “holistic” 
strategy, with an added twist of idealization: the totality of claims in question 
is drawn not from current “folk morality” but from an ideally improved and 
corrected, future or hypothetical version of t
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morality”.13  
Many difficulties attend such an approach. One difficulty, in navigating the 
path to mature folk morality, is settling the issue of how to allocate weight to 
different claims of folk morality — a more nuanced relative of the problem of 
how to demarcate the core from the periphery.14 Another — highlighted by 
such issues — is the need to presume that radical moral disagreements, 
containing claims in danger of being relegated to the periphery, can all be 
eliminated in the “maturing” process — the need, in other words, for a 
presumption of convergence. This presumption may itself be, as some have 
claimed, a part of folk morality, indeed the very part which justifies Jackson’s 
account of the intended referents of moral terms: but it might be false, for all 
that. Jackson himself admits the possibility in principle of a failure of ideal 
convergence, and that something like relativism would be the consequence of 
that failure.15 
1.5 A trace of RFMM in Jackson 
We could describe the unwelcome fall-back outcome Jackson envisages, if 
moral “convergence” turns out to be a will-o-the-wisp, as one viewing moral 
discourse as divided into a family of dialects. In that case Jackson might think 
the proper goal of moral debate would be to arrive at “mature” versions of 
each of these “folk moral dialects”.  
But Jackson expresses optimism about convergence, seeing belief in 
convergence as itself a presumption of folk morality.16 So he prefers to frame 
the agenda in ethics — including folk ethics! — as moving towards a single, 
unified “mature folk morality”. However this view cannot give a credible 
account of current folk moral discourse unless there is more commonality in 
                                                
13 See Jackson(1998), Robinson(2009). 
14 Jackson says “It is no part of moral functionalism that all parts of the network that 
is folk morality are equal” — Jackson(1998), p. 134. See Papineau(1996) for a useful 
discussion of this issue and some of its implications, as it arises in the functionalist 
definition of theoretical terms in the sciences. 
15 For a critique of Jackson’s discussion see Robinson(2009). 
16 Richard Joyce(2011) astutely points out that this puts Jackson in danger of being 
“an accidental error theorist”: if the concept of morality essentially incorporates the 
idea of convergence, but in fact convergence cannot be guaranteed, morality in 
Jackson’s sense is at risk of not existing. 
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current folk use of moral terms than simply an implicit meta-ethical 
standpoint which involves faith in ultimate convergence. Unless we view the 
folk as univocal in their use of moral terms merely in virtue of sharing implicit 
common knowledge of and commitment to Jacksonian meta-ethics, the 
problem of securing common meanings has not been dodged if current moral 
discourse at the normative level splits into a multiplicity of “folk moral 
dialects”.  
This I think is a good standpoint from which to view the following remarks 
about the role of “good enough” commonality in fixing shared meanings, 
from Jackson (1998), pp. 131-32:  
“The principles of folk morality are what we appeal to when we debate 
moral questions. They are the tenets we regard as settling our moral 
debates. ‘… It would be a betrayal of friendship not to testify on Jones’s 
behalf, so I’ll testify.’ … The dispute-settling nature of such a tenet 
shows that at the time in question and relative to the audience with whom we 
are debating, the tenet is part of our folk morality. If there were not such 
benchmarks we could not hold a sensible moral discussion with our 
fellows. Nevertheless these benchmark tenets are far from immutable 
…  
“What is, though, true is that there is a considerable measure of 
agreement about the general principles broadly stated.”… 
“We can think of the rather general principles that we share as the 
commonplaces or platitudes or constitutive principles that make up the 
core we need to share in order to count as speaking a common moral 
language….” 
Although these brief remarks from Jackson are simply addressing what he 
sees as being — or at least hopes to be — the merely temporary lack of 
complete convergence in moral opinions, their relevance to the puzzles 
associated (from an absolutist cognitivist standpoint) with radical moral 
disagreements, should be evident. The remarks about “benchmarks” required 
in order for us to engage in “a sensible moral discussion”, and “speaking a 
common moral language” appear made to order to address the problem of 
“failing to disagree” raised by such disagreements (namely, the problem that 
insofar as they provide evidence that the disputants are using moral terms 
with different cognitive contents, they provide evidence that the supposed 
disagreement is merely a case of talking past one another).  
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Notable points in what Jackson says include the following. Firstly, the 
principles are represented as “dispute-settling”, suggesting they have some 
canonical status equipping them to over-ride particular judgments. Secondly, 
although Jackson, given his assumptions, says they are “mutable”, he 
nevertheless – as if to correct any mistaken impression this may give – says 
that “what is though true is that there is a considerable measure of agreement 
about the general principles broadly stated”. The overall picture is one 
according to which there is enough agreement to secure a common language, 
and to provide the wherewithal to settle moral disputes, by appeal to agreed 
“benchmarks”. 
These are the remarks from Jackson which are reminiscent, arguably, of the 
position I call “Rules Fix Moral Meanings”. To briefly sum up the essential 
core of Part 1, I have claimed that a straightforward construal of cases of 
radical moral disagreement, consistent with cognitivism, is that there is 
variability in the cognitive content (i.e., in the truth conditions) assigned by 
the disputants to moral claims about which they disagree. If so, yet the 
disputants are making bona fide moral claims, then absolutism is in trouble. 
Since a consequence of retaining cognitivism under those circumstances is 
that people do not have a genuine disagreement, cognitivism is also in trouble. 
A common diagnosis is that the judgment that one party has and which the 
other party opposes is not, or not only, a belief, but is at least in part another 
kind of judgment containing expressivist or imperativist elements such as 
non-cognitivists invoke. The RFMM proposal for avoiding these 
consequences is to hold that the cognitive contents of the disputants’ 
opposing claims do render them genuinely in contradiction with one another, 
because the meanings of all such claims are governed by a finite set of moral 
principles which canonically determine the meaning of moral terms they 
contain. Thus those terms have common meanings in the disputants’ mouths 
regardless of how they actually view the truth or falsity, in the relevant 
circumstances, of the disputed claims.  
Part 2 Putting Moral Principles in their Place 
2.1 Arguing against RFMM 
In what follows I shall present three arguments against RFMM, two of them 
brief, and one of them more extended. These arguments will in turn be 
followed up with some concluding remarks expressing skepticism about the 
special status of moral rules or principles generally.  
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The general implication of all these arguments will be that moral 
understanding and commitment are not well represented as grasp of and 
commitment to a set of rules or principles. This point is highlighted by 
illustrating some different ways in which members of a group might 
reasonably be said to be mutually committed to a common set of moral 
principles, yet be capable of radical moral disagreement. These disagreements 
might arise between members of such a group, simply because of differences 
in how they respond to cases in which distinct individual rules apply, and 
clash. Only by dismissing those differences as reflecting someone’s misuse of 
moral terms by their own lights, thus not bona fide manifestations of moral 
understanding, could we retain the view that two people’s commitment to the 
same moral principles suffices to demonstrate that their moral concepts, or 
the meanings they give their moral terms, are identical. But I shall argue that 
in such cases the differences clearly reflect differences in moral standpoint 
and are thus not well-represented as products of confusion. The deeper 
message here is that on any realistic account, even those who are committed 
to particular moral rules need to make moral judgments in the process of 
applying them to particular circumstances, so that the content of morality 
cannot realistically be encapsulated in a set of rules.  
Perhaps RFMM itself is consistent with relativism. Speakers of different moral 
dialects might be committed to different sets of moral principles, governing 
the meanings of the moral terms in those dialects. But here we are considering 
the possibility of employing RFMM to defend absolutist cognitivism against 
threats posed by the possibility of radical moral disagreements. If RFMM 
cannot stand up as a doctrine it can render no such service. 
2.2 Two brief arguments against RFMM 
2.2a Argument 1: Rules can be challenged without incoherence 
The first argument against such a use of RFMM is a very simple one. It is a 
near relative of the Open Question argument. The premise is that someone 
might coherently (even if mistakenly) raise a moral objection to the 
absolutist’s chosen set of moral principles. If an absolutist version of RFMM 
were true, this would involve some sort of self-contradiction, similar to 
claiming the standard metre (by a current definition) not to be 1 metre in 
length. This quick argument seems good to me, but might not impress those 
who dislike the Open Question argument. For argument’s sake let’s set it 
aside and move on to further objections.  
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2.2b Argument 2: Axiomatic systems as an inept model for RFMM 
So secondly, let’s consider a model for moral error which, cast in this role, 
RFMM might seem to require of us. At least in the case of radical moral 
disagreements, absolutists must assert that at least one of the parties is 
somehow in error. We assume that they share a commitment to the same term-
defining moral principles, so by the standards of RFMM they are equally 
competent in use of the same moral terms. By definition of radical moral 
disagreements, the disagreement cannot be consequent on a purely 
descriptive factual error. It must be a cognitive error in which moral terms are 
applied in a manner inconsistent with their actual meaning (a performance 
error, not a competence error, if you like).  
One available model, or metaphor, which might be applied here, is provided 
by a formally axiomatized theory taken as term-defining for a set of 
theoretical terms figuring in the axioms. Given that the axioms define the 
meanings of the terms, one who grasps and accepts the axioms may be said to 
know the meanings of the terms. Nevertheless it may not always be clear – 
indeed it may not even be logically decidable – what exactly is entailed by 
those axioms, making it easy enough for different parties to a dispute to have 
a common commitment to the meanings of the relevant terms, yet differ in 
their judgments as to what that entails vis a vis particular cases.  
Thus we have a proposed explanation for moral disagreement, and we have 
some kind of reason for thinking that further thought and deliberation might 
in principle lead to agreement, since that would seem to be the right way to 
overcome confusions about what entails what. Indeed insofar as we find 
evidence that we subscribe to common axioms, we will seem to have evidence 
for some optimism of that kind. 
It seems to me that the implausibility of this model becomes evident as soon 
as we start to scrutinize it seriously. We are not generally taught an 
axiomatized theory of this kind in the course of our moral upbringing, nor do 
I believe our efforts to resolve moral disagreement typically take the form of 
running over complex patterns of deduction looking for new proofs, or slips 
in our logic. Nor should they. Such exercises would draw our attention away 
from the disputed cases and their evident morally relevant features. If 
someone who has seriously reflected on what is involved in a disputed and 
morally problematic case were to be shown that a contrary opinion to theirs 
could be deduced, by complicated and far from obvious logical reasoning, 
from some alleged set of moral axioms, an obvious candidate response for 
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them would be to apply modus tollens and reject or qualify one or more of 
those axioms. It doesn’t take exceptional logical acumen to appreciate what is 
at stake in cases like that of the large man on the bridge: radical moral 
disagreements do not generally hinge on unusual complexity or subtle 
deductive fallacies.  
2.3 Argument 3: A Spectrum of Diverse Roles for Sets of Rules, and its 
implications  
The slightly more elaborate argument to which I now turn, will, I hope, bring 
out more fully why this highly idealized, but perhaps initially tempting, 
axiomatic-system model, does not really give a credible account of radical 
moral disagreement. I want to highlight how much can be left unsettled by 
acceptance of, or conformity to, a set of moral principles. I shall suggest that 
spelling out the ambiguity in such ideas of “acceptance” or “conformity”, 
highlights the extent to which making moral judgments cannot realistically be 
portrayed as essentially consisting of applications of rules to cases. The 
argument begins by listing some options on a spectrum. Each item on the 
spectrum (which by no means claims to be exhaustive) provides a different 
sketch of how one might understand what is involved in commitment to a set 
of moral principles, in relation to determining permissible and obligatory 
actions. I deliberately give very abstract formulations. I hope the list is of 
some interest in its own right. 
What follows revolves centrally around the following claim. Commitment to rules 
underdetermines moral judgment: shared commitment to rules underdetermines 
moral agreement. 
2.31  A spectrum of options 
2.31A Spectrum, Category A: Rules without Degrees 
In these cases a set of rules is taken as absolute in the sense of admitting no 
degree. A rule either applies to a case or it does not. Any action is either in 
violation of this set of rules, or not. But in all but one of the following options, 
individual rules may be “trumped” or “disabled” by others in the set, based 
on an ordering which is either fixed, or which undergoes variation according 
to the situation. 
Ai: Strict Absolute Rules with Moral Traps 
There are absolute moral principles, each saying either that a certain type of 
action is wrong without exception – impermissible – or saying that a certain 
 19 
type of action is (in specified circumstances) obligatory. Let’s think of the 
rules as numbered 1, 2, etc., and the corresponding action-types as numbered 
A1, A2, etc. Suppose it is possible to find oneself in circumstances such that 
one is obliged to perform an action of type A1, but the only available way of 
doing so is to perform an action which is also of type A2, which is 
impermissible. Then it would be possible to find oneself faced with no 
alternative but to do wrong – either by failing to perform an obligatory act, or 
by performing an impermissible act. This view accepts that consequence: 
sometimes one can only do wrong. Avoiding wrongdoing may require 
substantial care and anticipation in steering clear of these moral traps! 
Aii: Moral rules with fixed ranking 
The next, perhaps more humane, point on our spectrum is one in which 
principles are absolute in only a slightly weaker sense. The enumeration of 
principles now represents a priority ranking. Actions must be rigidly in 
accord with all principles except that no principle is to be followed if doing so 
would violate a higher-ranking principle — unless the higher-ranking 
principle is already outranked by one still higher-ranking, which mandates 
the action. One never acts wrongly if one acts in accordance with the ranking 
of principles in this sense. Where rules conflict, lesser-ranked rules are, so to 
speak, “switched off”. 
Aiii: Moral rules with contextually variable rankings: 
The next possibility is exactly like the previous except that the ranking of 
principles is not fixed, but varies in a specific, pre-determined way according 
to context. (To take a silly illustrative example: perhaps “never consort with 
murderers” usually overrides “do not spurn offers of hospitality”, but the 
order is reversed when the hospitality is offered by a murderer who happens 
to be one’s father-in-law.)  
Aiv: Moral rules with contextual-feature and action-feature-dependent variable 
rankings: 
This is like the previous case, with an added, perhaps artificial, degree of 
complexity. But I believe it deserves notice as a possibility. For brevity I 
combine two variations on the previous case. The first is simple. Rather than a 
finite set of context-types, each of which induces a different priority-ranking 
for the moral principles, we imagine a number of contextual features which 
can be present in varying degrees. It is the combination of such features 
which determines the appropriate ranking of moral rules in a given situation. 
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Perhaps this could be crudely modeled by imagining an algorithm which 
takes the degrees to which various features are present, yielding a priority-
ranking, but it would be more realistic to imagine that actual moral agents 
weigh up and judge the relevance of different features in a manner which is 
not overtly quantitative.  
Illustrative example: “This occasion is in part a religious function, it has 
political significance and public interest, but it is also to an important degree a 
celebratory social gathering. Am I required to observe the rule — prioritized 
at religious functions and public political events — forbidding the telling of 
risqué jokes in the presence of clergy, or is it in this context trumped by the 
rule requiring one to share in the fun on social occasions?”. 
The second variation on the previous case is slightly more complicated and 
more conjectural. There are features of actions themselves which strike me as 
somewhat like action “contexts”, in that, plausibly, they are not reasonably 
thought of as essential to action types as such. Thus a chosen action may have 
morally relevant features, capable of being present in varying degrees, over 
and above what is minimally required if no applicable rule is to be broken. 
There are, as one says, many ways to skin a cat, and since purely generic 
actions are impossible, any action actually performed will have many features, 
intended or not, inessential to the primary description under which it is 
intended. Even after context has been taken into account, the degree to which 
these features are present in a chosen action may affect the ranking of 
principles governing retrospective moral evaluation of that action.  
Illustrative example: “The doctor was morally obliged to calm down the 
elderly lady in the church who was having a panic attack — knowing it 
would be putting her weak heart at risk. He could have done this without 
telling a risqué joke (so as to break the tension), so he was under no rule-
governed obligation to break the prohibition on telling such jokes in church. 
Nevertheless, he should not be counted as acting wrongly given that by doing 
so he drew attention away from the old lady and onto himself, thereby 
sparing her the further embarrassment which, had he taken more orthodox 
action, would otherwise have ensued. ‘Minimize embarrassment to others’ 
would not normally override ‘do not tell risqué jokes in church’, but given 
how mortified she would have been to have him make her breathe into a 
brown-paper bag in public, the considerate manner in which he carried out an 
action of a type which was in any case obligatory is morally permissible (as it 
would not have been had he muffed it and merely exacerbated her panic).” 
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That completes my short list of Category A options. Two features of them 
should be specially noted. Firstly, it is likely that in a great majority of cases 
the differences between these options would be of no account — invisible, in 
effect — because in those cases no applicable moral principles clash. So a 
population of people each of whom occupies some place on this spectrum 
with respect to the same set of rules might often present an appearance of 
strong moral consensus. Secondly, with the exception of the first (“moral 
traps”) option, they all resolve clashes between principles, should they arise, 
by employing rankings, fixed or variable, to disable some of the clashing 
principles. They are all in that sense consistent with the view that moral 
principles, when not disabled, are absolute: they brook no exceptions and 
involve no relativity and no watering-down. A person adhering to any of 
these patterns might reasonably be said to be committed to, or at least to 
conform to, the rules in the relevant set.  
2.31B Spectrum, Category B: Moral rules with weights and degrees 
Morally relevant component features:  
Another kind of possibility arises if, instead of taking it that, in a given case, a 
rule either applies totally or not at all, we think of moral principles as rules to 
which an action might conform in varying degrees. Instead of options like the 
above, one might see the moral merit of an action as determined by reference 
both to the context of action and the particular degree to which a given action 
(taking into account the manner of performing it) instantiates distinct morally 
relevant features corresponding to different principles. Evaluation would be 
based, roughly speaking, on whether an action, given its context, maximizes 
overall conformity to those principles. Once again, rankings of principles 
might be relevant, and once again they might be regarded as fixed or as 
variable for a range of quantifiable or unquantifiable reasons. But rather than 
determining which rules can “switch off” others they outrank, the rankings 
will affect how much weight the various moral principles carry, in judging an 
action’s overall moral merit. On this view, one could say, correct evaluation of 
an action — its moral goodness — is determined by the contextually 
appropriate weight assigned to the morally relevant features, and the degree 
to which they are instantiated by the action. Once again, there is no reason to 
think there is any absolute correct way of quantifying diverse kinds of 
morally relevant features (“the action was unkind, but how unkind was it?”), 
nor to think that if there were, any particular way of aggregating such 
numbers would be uncontroversially mandatory. 
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Further uncertainties arise as soon as we contemplate evaluating choice of 
action by asking which available action had the highest moral value. “Choose 
the best available action” (where “best” is evaluated in this manner) is a 
dubious rule, since at any given moment, skill and ingenuity are not entirely 
under voluntary control (as professional sportspeople are well aware, since an 
“off day” can be very costly for them). But ingenuity may be required to 
perceive a possible action, and skill to carry it off — for instance, in saving a 
life. This makes it in various respects a vague rule — for instance, it does not 
say how to incorporate perceived risk of failure, in deciding which action is 
“available”. (It may useful here to reflect on the question of whether it is 
sometimes a vice to be a “klutz”. Someone who frequently rushes to help but 
most often muffs it – not merely failing to catch the falling sugar, but spilling 
the milk as well – needs to learn that the moral credit accruing to “helpful” 
people may not really be theirs to claim.)  
For present purposes there is no special point in trying to enumerate 
variations of Category B approaches. It’s evident, I think, that there are 
countless ways in which people who respond similarly to similar morally 
relevant features, and who even mostly give them similar priority rankings, 
might respond differently to complex combinations of those features in 
various degrees. It’s also evident, surely, that the range of morally relevant 
features is quite large, so that one aspect of the prima facie appeal of RFMM —
the simplicity of the picture it presents of moral evaluation — is considerably 
lessened once we start equating conforming to moral principles with responding 
to morally relevant features.17 
2.32 Notable points 
As will perhaps be obvious, the above list of options is designed to have 
certain features.  
Firstly, every option is meant to represent a way in which correct moral 
evaluation of someone’s actions might be understood as governed by that 
action’s conformity to some set of principles.  
Secondly, as we go down the list, an account of how the moral status of an 
action relates to the relevant set of moral principles must increasingly refer to 
other matters not captured in the principles themselves. Furthermore, those 
“other matters” – such things as the context of action, the fine-detailed 
                                                
17 Milo(1986) comes close to such an identification, seeming to equate criteria of moral 
relevance with moral standards. 
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description of the concrete action itself, and/or the degree to which the 
various principles apply to the action – appear to me, more or less 
increasingly as we go down the list, to have three related features. The first is 
that it is not generally plausible that they are all matters susceptible of being 
precisely measured or quantified. The second is that it is even less plausible 
that insofar as we take such matters into account in dealing with recalcitrant 
moral matters, we actually do measure or quantify them. The third is that the 
options seem to me to become increasingly similar (or decreasingly 
dissimilar) to how things work in real life — though this is an empirical claim 
which some might dispute, and I cannot speak for the experience of others. 
Thirdly, if two people agree that such and such is a correct list of moral 
principles – or generally both seem to show conformity to such a list in their 
actions — we have as yet little reason to predict that they will never disagree 
about difficult cases. Neither we nor they themselves may know how, when 
the chips are down, they will resolve conflicts between the principles. Even on 
an option as simple as A(ii), all it will take to leave people who mostly seem 
to conform to exactly the same principles, potentially in disagreement over 
certain difficult cases will be a difference in their ranking of the same moral 
principles. The number of possible variations increases enormously as the 
number of rules increases. (Consider: “Yes, I accept that violent criminals 
should be apprehended and that we should help the police to do so. Yes, I 
accept that the criminal was also wrong to steal food from the store. Under 
most circumstances I would have called the police. But I also believe children 
should be kept well-fed. You believe that too. But I gave it top priority and I 
knew the food was destined for the criminal’s hungry children. You don’t 
think that overrides the other considerations; I do.”) 
Fourthly, if it’s true that as we go down the list the options become more 
lifelike, then it seems to me we also move closer to a particularist vision of 
moral evaluation. According to most Category A positions on our spectrum, 
and with Category B positions even more so, what is required beyond simple 
matters of fact on the one hand, and moral principles on the other, in order 
not to leave indeterminate the moral evaluation appropriate to some 
particular action, is determination of a number of issues which themselves 
involve various kinds of evaluation. These issues may include the relative 
priority of principles, the degree to which various aspects of a situation or 
context affect that priority, the extent to which the particular details of a 
particular chosen action constitute it as an act falling under one or another 
principle, and to what degree or extent the act considered fully in its details 
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and in its context, counts as maximizing the suitably weighted and combined 
overall satisfaction of the relevant principles.  
It would be idle to pretend that these further matters of evaluation may 
themselves be settled in general by appeal to further principles. But what 
would be still more idle would be to pretend that we can optimistically hope 
that our typical community of moral agents agrees in their even implicit 
acceptance and application of a sufficient set of such second-order principles. 
Our ordinary ways of managing involve making summary evaluative 
judgments which at best only implicitly incorporate judgments about these 
second-order matters.  
Thus we reach the conclusion of this third argument. By now the cat of moral 
meaning has got out of the bag of moral principles. Any realistic criterion of 
assent or conformity to a set of moral rules or principles will leave far too much 
undetermined when it comes to how people will evaluate particular actions or 
situations, and what is left undetermined is clearly part and parcel of what evinces, in 
agents’ choices or evaluations of actions, their understanding of the content of, and 
the requirements imposed by, moral notions. If there is any such thing as the 
constitutive “core” of moral understanding, it cannot be characterized in 
terms of adherence to a small set of principles. 
Hence, to repeat a central contention of this paper, it is not very plausible that 
arguments for relativism from moral disagreement may be rebutted by 
pointing to large numbers of general moral principles on which there is 
agreement. Insofar as we can see in this a demotion in the status of general 
moral principles, perhaps we can see it as at least a step also in the direction 
of particularism, whether or not that destination, strictly speaking, is reached. 
2.4 Reflective equilibrium, particular judgments, and a demotion of rules 
Before trying to sum up an attitude to moral rules I think is consistent with 
the above discussion, I need to touch on a couple of other matters. The first of 
these is the notion of reflective equilibrium — both because, ever since its 
introduction by Rawls18, it has become a mainstay of discussion about moral 
disagreement and moral deliberation, and because, since moral rules figure in 
its characterization, it provides a useful context in which to raise further 
skeptical questions about moral rules which carry over to prevailing ideas of 
the nature and role of reflective equilibrium itself. I’ve argued that moral 
                                                
18 Rawls(1951). 
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rules or principles are not alone sufficient to fix the meanings of moral terms 
or capture the core of moral understanding. We can now ask whether, and in 
what sense, moral rules or principles are even necessary to moral 
understanding.  
The notion of reflective equilibrium in part pictures a struggle in which 
particular moral evaluations are sometimes pitted against moral principles, 
adjustments being made on one side or the other (with whatever help moral 
theory has to lend) until equilibrium — signifying coherence — is achieved. If 
these two kinds of judgment may be pitted against one another, then one 
might wonder whether they have different origins or are grounded in 
different ways. Are particular moral judgments more or less firmly grounded 
than judgments about moral rules, and is the grounding of the same kind, or 
different, in the two kinds of case? Is accepting a moral rule itself a kind of 
moral judgment? Or is it just accepting a summary of actual or possible moral 
judgments? Is a moral rule a tool for producing moral judgments? Or is it, as 
is very commonly suggested (for instance by Michael Smith19, who makes the 
idea of reflective equilibrium central to his notion of “normative rationality”) 
a tool for justifying moral judgments? If someone was reliably capable of 
making particular moral judgments without invoking rules, what value 
would be added to their moral understanding were they to come in addition 
to accept various moral principles? Is unity of values truly a virtue? 
Smith’s view is that the value added is indeed the value of unity, providing a 
kind of coherentist justification which he sees as important to normative 
rationality. Others may think that the very abstractness and generality of 
moral rules makes judgments about them more error-prone. After all, it is 
implicit in the above discussion of ways in which rules may figure in moral 
evaluation, that the complexity of particular real life situations is always 
likely to outrun what can be contained in a rule or even a set of rules. The 
devil is in the details. Therefore, if rules extrapolate from known to further 
particular situations which they help to evaluate, there is a real risk that they 
will lead us astray, due to a mistaken application of the human penchant for 
simplifying things in order to make them neat and orderly. If on the other 
hand rules merely summarize what we already know, it may be thought, they 
cannot “add value”. 
These are large and important questions, which probably have as many 
                                                
19 In Smith(1992). See for instance pp. 159-160. 
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answers as there are kinds of moral theory. Shortly, I will simply express my 
own attitude, which is hinted at in the last sentence of the preceding 
paragraph — namely that rules are best thought of as mere summaries which 
do not explain, justify, or “add value” — and try, not so much to defend it as 
to merely make it somewhat comprehensible, by the use of a couple of 
philosophical analogies. 
But in order that my view should not seem altogether far-fetched, I need to 
make an important caveat. Naturally I accept that social life, with even a few 
basic shared goals, and particularly given any remotely egalitarian ideal, 
imposes heavy demands on people to conform, more or less, and to expect 
others to conform, more or less, to some mutually known set of rules. This is 
an important reason for putting up with much of what governments do, and 
in particular, for accepting the necessity for a legal system and for an 
apparatus of police, lawyers, judges and so forth, to operate it. That system, 
specially in societies which consider themselves not to be very corrupt, is 
often called “the Justice System”. Such a system is usually imperfect in that, 
much like many an economic system, it does not always produce outcomes of 
which we are prone to morally approve. “The law is an ass”, and “there is a 
moral as well as a legal code” are proverbial reminders of that fact. “The 
Justice System” is in fact not always just. Nevertheless, it might happen that, 
all things considered, it’s possible that there should be a legal code, and ways 
of arriving at and administering it, which might seem to be reasonably fair 
(particularly if embedded in a fair economic system, relieving the “Justice 
System” of the task of defending material inequities).  
It is a consequence of what I am suggesting that even the best such legal code 
and justice system, given the simple necessity of operating according to rules 
and principles which are, pretty much, common knowledge, may need to 
enforce legal judgments which have, by ordinary standards, ethically 
regrettable consequences (or at the very least, consequences which could only 
be viewed as not ethically regrettable after factoring in the desirability of 
having such a justice system at all). In short, it is likely that even the best 
system of law — even despite the human elements interpolated by judges and 
juries — will inevitably, at times, be “an ass”.  
But all that, surely, does not apply to “the moral code” itself? I think perhaps 
to some extent it does, and inevitably so, if we take the phrase “the moral 
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code” too literally.20 It is a frequent suggestion that “morality” is something 
shared which exists for the common good, rather like a more subtle and 
(insofar as not legally enforced) a more voluntaristic legal code. But if I am 
right about moral principles, there will be an inevitable possibility for internal 
tensions between the requirements of a shared and commonly known “moral 
code”, conceived as encapsulated in a set of moral principles. Thus it might 
seem inevitable, given what I have said about moral principles, that even “the 
moral code” will at times also be “an ass”.  
But how could what is morally prescribed be morally wrong? Does this line of 
thought lead to a quick reductio? 
There is a wrong way and a right way to respond to this challenge. Only the 
wrong way, which rests with the idea of a legal-system-like moral code, leads 
to a reductio. The right way, is to see that ideally what we would like to see in a 
shared social morality is a tendency to agree in moral judgments even where 
there is no deductive path from shared moral principles to a particular 
judgment. We should not think of morality, viewed communally, as literally a 
“code” similar to the legal code. A shared capacity for particularized and 
contextually appropriate moral judgment should be seen as part, ideally, of 
what morally binds a community. 
Still and all, the message to be drawn from the possibility of radical moral 
disagreements is that we cannot reasonably hope to have a social morality 
which is so perfectly shared that like telepaths, or a certain stereotype of 
identical twins, we all always concur in our moral judgments, with or without 
the aid of rules. This is in part good news. One of the functions of moral 
language is to enable us to express our moral differences. We do not wish to have 
a blanket permission to rule moral critics out of court on the grounds that, 
tautologously, they are misusing moral language and making merely schmoral 
objections.21 This is something we should not only learn, but welcome, from 
                                                
20 It seems to me that some do. Compare for instance the reference to “a set of 
principles” in this contractualist statement from Scanlon: “An act is wrong if its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles 
for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis 
for informed, unforced, general agreement.” (Scanlon 1998, p. 153). 
21 A view which Milo(1986) seems to flirt with. I should emphasize that it is 
consistent with my view that sometimes it can be right to dismiss a proposed 
alternative moral view as a “merely schmoral” claim. I believe that is implicit in what 
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the perennial relevance of the Open Question argument. Losing the 
permanent possibility of moral disagreement would mean losing one of the 
central functions of moral language in expressing some of our most important 
differences. 
Let me finish, then with a couple of metaphors and analogies, in which I shall 
attempt to bring to life the kind of view I am urging, of moral rules. First, a 
metaphor. Let’s consider a sort of distant analogy with the Euthyphro issue. 
Suppose the gods say that we ought to do X. We might decide that it is true 
that we ought to do X, but not because the gods say we ought to do it, rather 
the reverse: the gods say we ought to do X, because we ought to do X. If the 
gods always get this right, it will be true for any X, that if the gods say that we 
ought to do X then we ought to do X. Yet this makes them moral authorities 
only in a demoted sense: they do not make moral truth, merely report it. 
Suppose we have some alternative account of what does make moral truth, 
which implies that we are in principle (if we work at it) well-placed to judge 
such matters for ourselves. Someone might say “I was confused about what to 
do and I sat down to make a considered judgment – but I was so tired: in the 
end I just took the gods’ advice – they usually get it right”. This would be to 
demote the gods to the status of something like a personal database or GPS 
system. For an idea of the view I am suggesting, substitute “moral principles” 
for “the gods”, in the above. 
A similar point can be made by reference to David Lewis’s account of laws of 
nature, which goes roughly as follows. Given all the truths there are, 
expressed in a suitably naturalistic language, there might be a deductively-
closed system containing only a subset of the truths, but which by suitable 
standards combines strength and simplicity better than any true rival system. 
The laws of nature are all the contingent generalizations belonging to that 
deductive system. On such a view, a law of nature is part of a neat summary 
of a large and highly patterned portion of the truth. But neither such a law, 
nor any of its consequences, is true in any different sense, or on any other 
grounds, from other contingent truths. Logically, all facts are on a par. If some 
fact conflicts with what would otherwise be a law, there is simply no contest: 
there is no such law. Lewis’s view is quite compatible with the existence of 
laws of nature: they simply do no work in making anything true.  
                                                                                                                                      
I have said about the ineliminable cognitive element in moral claims. But we don’t 
want a view which makes this response regularly available. 
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Similarly, there may be true moral principles. Yet it may be the case that they 
provide no independent source of motivation or moral justification, and are 
best regarded as simply useful (and perhaps only roughly accurate) 
summaries of, or guides to, the truth of groups of particular moral judgments 
or evaluations. In this case, if a particular moral judgment comes into conflict 
with acceptance of a moral rule, the rule is what should always be discarded. 
Finally, an example directed towards those who believe that moral principles 
must play an indispensible role if people are to make moral judgments, be 
taught how to make them, understand moral concepts, and generally to make 
communicative use of moral vocabulary, without being at cross-purposes.  
Consider beauty. We make judgments of beauty, learn to employ the concept, 
learn to communicate about beauty, agree about some instances, disagree 
about others, and so on. Manifestly, none of this requires any of us to 
formulate “rules of beauty”. Nor would we be likely to feel tempted to revise 
our judgments of beauty merely because someone pointed out that they were 
in breach of some supposed rule. Even if rules were devised by careful 
observation of the causal regularities governing our prior judgments of 
beauty and their relationship to (for instance) patterns of visual stimuli, we 
would feel under no particular compulsion to make further judgments in 
conformity with them. 
It’s important to note that when we judge an art-work, a person, or a scene to 
be beautiful, we may point out features which we take to make an important 
contribution to the beauty we see. Obviously we often do this. But it would be 
mistaken to infer that we thereby justify our judgment by appeal to some 
principle to the effect that such and such a kind of feature contributes to 
beauty. It is not like that at all, and it is our knowledge of this which explains 
why (if we do) we find the idea of rules of beauty ludicrous.  
I don’t suggest that there is a complete analogy between the concept of the 
beautiful, and central moral concepts. Moral judgments have a practical 
importance which judgments of beauty mostly do not. Perhaps that difference 
is crucial – perhaps the practical importance of moral judgments requires us 
to try to formulate and act in accordance with moral principles. But that 
would need to be argued. It is true that a presumption of objectivity seems to 
be an element of much folk moral discourse, whereas it is proverbial that 
“beauty is in the eye of the beholder”. Nevertheless I think the point stands 
that there can be no quick and easy argument from the learnability of an 
evaluative concept and our capacity to communicate by use of a term 
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expressing it, to the claim that we must at some level know and appeal to 
general principles stating necessary or sufficient conditions for its application. 
The crucial claim the analogy is meant to support is that not only are rules, 
contrary to RFMM, insufficient to fix agreement in principle about the 
extensions (and hence, to fix agreement about the meanings) of terms of 
moral evaluation: even in those many cases where agreement about the 
extension of those terms is to be found, rules have no essential role in 
bringing this about. 
So, I conclude, there may be true and useful moral generalizations. Perhaps 
there are fundamental component determinants of goodness and badness, or 
of rightness and wrongness, which, contra some versions of particularism, 
never change their valency, so that for each of them, there is a kind of moral 
generalization one might formulate, to that effect. For all that, I say, we 
should not think of moral principles as having some sort of special and 
distinctive warrant, ground, or authority, which makes it appropriate for 
them to act as a corrective to particular moral judgments.22 
 
Terminological Appendix. 
I see arguments from radical moral disagreement as challenging in the first 
instance a conjunction of interwoven doctrines, including moral cognitivism, 
realism, descriptivism, and absolutism, where the latter is taken to exclude 
both relativism and subjectivism. But because it highlights the doctrines I most 
wish to challenge, I use the short phrase “absolutist cognitivism” to refer to 
this complex conjunction of doctrines, though other conjuncts (specially 
realism!) should not be forgotten. 
                                                
22 This paper began life (in a very different form) as a contribution to a Workshop on 
Normativity and Mentality in a World of Causality, at the Swedish Collegium for 
Advanced Study, Uppsala, September 25-26, 2008. I am grateful to Folke Tersman 
and to the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, for making it possible for me to 
visit Uppsala for the Workshop. I am also indebted to the Philosophy Department at 
Victoria University (Wellington) for an invitation to deliver a version of this paper to 
their Departmental Research seminar in June, 2009. Philosophically I am indebted to 
the participants in the Uppsala Workshop and at the Victoria University seminar, 
and I am specially indebted for philosophical input and support to John Bishop, 
Bronwyn Finnigan, Fred Kroon, and Folke Tersman. Thanks to John Davis for 
helpful comments on a penultimate draft. 
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My use of some of the terminology in the above paragraph needs briefly 
clarifying.  
“Realism” here includes both the denial of semantic anti-realism for moral 
statements, and the denial of an “error-theoretic” assignment of falsehood to 
all substantial moral claims.   
I follow Jackson (1998) in using the term “descriptivism” as a substitute for 
Moore’s “naturalism” (the latter term is currently over-worked and has 
inappropriate contemporary connotations relating to the role of natural 
science, and the like). The crucial claim for present purposes is that 
cognitivists should accept as a priori that moral properties necessarily 
supervene on “purely descriptive” properties. Jackson concludes — and 
rightly so, on an appropriate conception of properties — that given this 
supervenience, moral properties must be identified with purely descriptive 
properties.  
Whether “response-dependent” accounts of the meanings of moral terms are 
consistent with “absolutism” will hinge on their success in articulating a viable 
notion of “ideal rationality”, “counterfactually ideal selves”, or some such, 
adequate to sustain the doctrine that those making moral claims may be 
viewed as committed to understanding their truth-conditions as jointly 
tracking a hypothetical consensus of idealized responses, rather than merely 
individual responses. I’m pessimistic about this idea of a hypothetical 
“factoring out” of the subjectivity inherent in the idea of response-
dependence.  
Throughout, I am supposing that according to subjectivism, the truth (or 
propriety) of people’s moral judgments supervenes on their mental states, 
and that according to relativism people’s moral judgments are true (or 
appropriate) only relative to some parameter, or some index (some element of 
indexicality) which might or might not be individual, mental, or reflexive. 
(Thus I am using it in a far more inclusive sense than, for instance, “cultural 
relativism”.) 
I shall not try to give more finely-tuned accounts of these meta-ethical 
doctrines. A useful discussion of their complex relationships is to be found in 
Chapter One of Tersman(2006). 
 
Denis Robinson 
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